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ARGUMENT 
L THE RULE REQUIRING MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT 
DISPOSITIVE OF THIS APPEAL 
Appellee devotes a considerable portion of her appellate brief to emphasizing Appellant's 
claimed failure to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's rulings. Clearly, Appellee has 
misconstrued and misunderstood Appellant's arguments. The marshaling rule requires appellants 
to marshal the evidence in support of a court's findings, then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence the court's findings are erroneous and against the weight of the evidence. See State in 
the Interest of ST.. 928 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah App. 1996); Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 
(Utah 1991). However, the duty to marshal the evidence arises only where the appellant 
challenges the trial court's findings of fact. See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d at 199. Where the 
factual findings of the lower court are not challenged, the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law and the application of the law to the facts of the case. See Saunders v. Sharp. 
806 P.2d at 199-200. 
In the present case, appellee mistakenly argues that appellant has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting certain findings of fact, when actually appellant has not directly challenged 
the findings of fact. First, appellee attempts to assert the marshaling rule regarding a finding the 
court never made. Appellee states that the court specifically found appellant's relationship with 
the children had materially changed. Review of the court's findings does not support appellee's 
assertion; the court did not make such a finding. Rather, the court found that the co-parenting 
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relationship had deteriorated. 
Appellee also asserts the marshaling rule with regard to the court's finding that the joint 
parenting relationship had broken down. However, appellant does not challenge this finding, and 
thus the marshaling rule is irrelevant. Appellee again turns to the marshaling rule with regard to 
the court's finding that vesting custody of the children with appellee is in the children's best 
interests. Appellant does not challenge this factual finding, but rather advances the legal argument 
that the court should not have reached the best interests analysis. Accordingly, the marshaling 
rule is inapplicable and is not dispositive of the issues raised in this appeal. 
II. UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-10.4(2) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE 
Utah Code Section 30-3-10.4 provides, in pertinent part: 
"(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may, after a 
hearing, modify an order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have materially and 
substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified, or the order has 
become unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be an 
improvement for and in the best interest of the child. 
"(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be terminated by order of the court if both 
parents file a motion for termination. At the time of entry of an order terminating joint 
legal custody, the court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10. 
All related issues, including visitation and child support, shall also be determined and 
ordered by the court." 
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Appellee incorrectly relies on subsection (2), which requires the order of joint legal 
custody to be terminated by order of the court "if both parents file a motion for termination." In 
the present case, however, appellant did not file a motion for termination of the joint custody 
arrangement. Although appellant sought sole custody of the children, he did so in the course of 
the litigation, and only in direct response to appellee's petition for an award of sole custody. 
Appellee raised the custody issue and brought it before the court, and appellant was forced to 
respond. 
Appellee construes U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(2) to apply and mandate termination of joint 
custody when both joint legal custodians seek sole custody in the course of litigation. Appellee's 
construction of subsection (2) is incorrect, because it renders language in subsection (1) 
meaningless. Subsection (1) applies when "one or both of the joint legal custodians" seek to 
change a joint custody order on the grounds that it has become unworkable or a material and 
substantial change of circumstances has occurred. If appellee's construction of the statute were 
correct, anytime "both joint legal custodians" sought a change in custody arrangements under 
subsection (1), the court would be forced to terminate the joint legal custody without considering 
whether joint custody had become unworkable or whether a material and significant change in 
circumstances had occurred. In other words, in certain situations appellee's construction of 
subsection (2) would force courts to bypass subsection (1), thus rendering that part of the statute 
meaningless. 
In determining the meaning of statutory provisions, the court "must attempt to give each 
part of the provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all its terms." In 
6 
re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). If uncertainty exists as to the meaning or 
application of a statute's provisions, the court should "analyze the act in its entirety and 
harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose." Id Further, 
"'statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful, and ... interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision 
nonsensical or absurd.' Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934. 936 (Utah 1980V Perrine v. 
Kennecott Min. Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290. 1292 (Utah 1996V 
A more reasonable construction of subsection (2) is that it applies where both joint legal 
custodians act together to affirmatively seek termination of joint custody. Subsection (2) should 
not apply where one joint legal custodian unilaterally seeks to end the joint custody arrangement 
by commencing litigation and forcing the other joint legal custodian to respond. The legislature 
clearly intended subsection (1) to govern such a situation, and intended the courts to inquire as to 
a material and substantial change of circumstances or the workability of continued joint custody. 
These elements are in place in subsection (1) specifically to prevent one joint legal custodian from 
unilaterally destroying the joint legal custody. 
In the present case, appellant's actions should not be construed as a motion for 
termination of joint custody under U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(2). Rather, this case should fall under 
subsection (1), which applies to a motion of "one or both of the joint legal custodians" seeking 
modification of a joint custody order. Accordingly, contrary to appellee's contention, subsection 
(2) does not apply to the case at bar. The trial court correctly proceeded under subsection (1) and 
inquired into whether a material and substantial change of circumstances had occurred. 
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HI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE SECTION 30-
3-10.4(1) TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1) is applicable to the instant case. However, the trial court applied the 
statute to the facts of the case in an incorrect manner. U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1) (a) provides a two-
step inquiry. First, the trial court must determine whether "the circumstances of the child or one 
or both custodians have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be 
modified," or whether the joint custody order "has become unworkable or inappropriate under 
existing circumstances." U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a). See Hogge v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51. 54 (Utah 
1982) (stating that determination of whether substantial and material change of circumstances has 
occurred is the first step in the change of custody analysis). Second, the trial court considers 
whether a change in custody arrangements is in the best interest of the child. U.C.A. 30-3-
10.4(l)(b). In the present case, the trial court incorrectly applied the first step of the analysis. 
In determining whether a substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred, 
the court should not consider changes in circumstances caused by the conduct of the noncustodial 
parent now seeking custody. In Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P.2d 942, 948 (Utah App. 1988), the 
court essentially held that changes in circumstances which were a consequence of the 
noncustodial parent's conduct should not be considered by the trial court. The court concluded 
that "Respondent [Mr. Fullmer] cannot use the circumstances he created to reopen the child 
custody issue. To hold otherwise would provide incentive to noncustodial parents to create 
havoc in the custodial parent's circumstances in order to justify reconsideration of the custody 
award." Id at 948. 
In the present case, the court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred, 
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namely, the joint parenting relationship had broken down. However, in applying U.C.A. 30-3-
10.4(l)(a), the court failed to consider whether the change in circumstances had been caused by 
the noncustodial parent, in this case the appellee. Under the rationale of Fullmer, the court should 
not have considered changes in circumstances directly caused by the appellee's conduct. Here, 
the breakdown in the joint custody relationship was a direct consequence of appellee's conduct in 
initiating the "tug-of-war" custody battle. This case presents exactly the type of situation Fullmer 
sought to proscribe: appellee created havoc in appellant's circumstances and the joint custodial 
relationship in order to obtain reconsideration of the custody arrangement. By failing to 
recognize the rule of law set forth in Fullmer, the trial court applied U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a) 
incorrectly and considered the changes in circumstances wrought by appellee's conduct. 
The same rationale applies to the language in U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a) directing the court 
to inquire whether the joint custody order "has become unworkable or inappropriate under 
existing circumstances." U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a) (Emphasis added). Following the Fullmer 
rationale, the phrase "existing circumstances" should be construed to exclude changed 
circumstances caused by the conduct of the noncustodial parent. In addition, it should be noted 
that the trial court did not proceed under this line of inquiry; rather, the trial court found a 
material change of circumstance. Thus, even assuming the joint custody order was unworkable 
under existing circumstances, this court cannot rely on such assumption, because the trial court 
did not make that finding for this court to review. 
Finally, appellee attempts to distinguish Fullmer on its facts. First, appellee alleges that 
Fullmer is distinguishable because in the present case appellant posed a threat to the children's 
emotional and physical health. Appellee's assertion is ludicrous; the trial court made no such 
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finding. Next, appellee contends Fullmer is distinguishable because the cases are factually 
different. In Fullmer, the custodial parent's circumstances changed because the noncustodial 
parent sought modification of the child custody order on the night before the custodial parent was 
scheduled to move to another state, thus forcing the custodial parent to hire an attorney and 
hurriedly arrange temporary living accommodations and employment. In the present case, 
circumstances changed when the joint custody co-parenting relationship was damaged by 
appellee's initiation of the bitter custody dispute. The factual differences between the cases are of 
no consequence and do not lessen the import of the rationale advanced by the Fullmer court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILDREN ARE NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THIS APPEAL. 
Appellee mistakenly argues that because appellant does not challenge the factual finding 
that granting custody to appellee is in the children's best interests, the trial court's decision must 
be affirmed. Appellee could not be more wrong. The trial court never should have reached the 
issue of the children's best interests, because under a proper application of the law, the trial court 
would not have progressed beyond the material and substantial change of circumstances inquiry. 
In Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472, 475-76 (Utah App. 1991), the court held that "[o]nly 
if a substantial change of circumstances is found should the trial court consider whether a change 
of custody is appropriate given the child's best interests." See U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1); Hogge v. 
Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982). See also Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 839 (Utah App. 
1991) (affirming trial court's decision not to change a stipulated joint custody order, and finding 
trial court properly based its refusal to change custody on the lack of a substantial change in 
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circumstances without reaching the issue of the best interests of the children). 
Appellee contends that because the initial joint custody order arose from a stipulation of 
the parties, the children's best interests are dispositive. This court flatly rejected appellee's 
argument in Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1992). In that case, the court noted 
that Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), modified the Hogge test and liberalized the scope 
of evidence allowed on the issue of changed circumstances to allow parties to introduce evidence 
of a change's effect on a child's best interest. Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d at 596-97. The court 
held, however, that the "fundamental burden to establish a material change of circumstances was 
not diminished" merely because the challenged custody decree was based on default. Id at 597. 
In other words, even though Elmer allows evidence of a child's best interests to be introduced, 
the fundamental burden of establishing a substantial and material change of circumstances 
remains. See Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d at 596-97; Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 621-22 
(Utah App. 1991). Therefore, the trial court's finding regarding the children's best interests is not 
dispositive of this appeal. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the evidence regarding the children's best interests 
related solely to the breakdown in the joint custody relationship, and did not independently 
establish some other material change in circumstances. Even if the best interests evidence could 
establish an alternative change in circumstances, a change not caused by appellee's conduct, the 
trial court did not make any such finding for this court to review. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND RECOGNIZE THAT THE 
BREAKDOWN IN THE JOINT CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS A RESULT OF 
THE CUSTODY LITIGATION. 
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The trial court found a material change of circumstances occurred in March of 1995 when 
the appellee remarried. Although the trial court established March 1995 as the time frame for 
when some difficulties first arose, the trial court did not expressly find that appellee's remarriage 
was the sole or even the primary cause of the joint parenting problems. It is important to 
remember that appellee had lived with her new husband since 1992, and that therefore her 1995 
remarriage did not create any substantive changes in visitation, living arrangements, or any other 
relevant aspect of the joint parenting arrangement. Appellant contends that even assuming for the 
sake of argument that the remarriage did play a minor part in the problems with the joint parenting 
arrangement, the record clearly shows that the initiation and continuation of the custody litigation 
played a more serious role and was the dominant cause of the joint parenting problems. The trial 
court failed to acknowledge this crucial evidence and failed to recognize the effect the custody 
litigation had on the joint custody relationship. 
The record contains direct evidence, some in the form of appellant's testimony, 
unequivocally showing that the breakdown in the joint custody relationship was caused and 
facilitated by the commencement of the child custody litigation. However, appellee contends that 
appellant's testimony cannot be considered because the trial court found his credibility lacking. 
While the trial court did offer its belief that appellant had been "playing games" during the 
pendency of the litigation, including during discovery, the trial court did not expressly find that 
appellant was not a credible witness at trial. More importantly, the trial court did not find that 
appellant's testimony regarding the cause of the joint parenting problems was not credible. 
Contrary to appellee's assertion, the trial court's statement regarding appellant's pre-trial conduct 
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cannot be read as a blanket indictment of his credibility on the witness stand. Further, this court 
cannot independently judge appellant's credibility. See Riche v. Riche. 784 p.2d 465, 467 (Utah 
App. 1989). Appellee's contention lacks merit. Appellant's testimony concerning the detrimental 
effect of the custody litigation is uncontro verted and should have been recognized by the trial 
court. 
VI. APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS, AND AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES IS NOT WARRANTED. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that if the court determines an 
appeal is frivolous, the court "shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, 
as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party." Rule 33(b) 
defines a frivolous appeal as "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 
In Erickson v. Wasatch Manor. Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah App. 1990), the court 
discussed the practice of penalizing frivolous appeals: 
"Sanctions for frivolous appeals have only been applied in egregious cases, such as when 
an appeal was filed in order to 'take unconscionable advantage' of the other party and 
therefore fails to meet the standards of good faith. Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398 
(Utah Ct.App.1987). 'Egregious cases may include those obviously without merit, with 
no reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment.' 
Maughan [v. Maughan]. 770 P.2d [156] at 162.... We have interpreted 'without merit' 
to mean an appeal 'without a reasonable legal or factual basis.' O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 
306, 309 (Utah Ct.App.1987)." 
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"The 'sanction' for bringing a frivolous appeal is applied only in egregious cases, 'lest 
there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.' Porco v. 
Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App.1988)." Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah 
App. 1989). Moreover, "an unsuccessful appeal which has some merit is not frivolous. See 
Hincklev v. Hincklev. 815 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (Utah App. 1991)." Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 
193, 199 (Utah App. 1992). 
In the present case, appellant's appeal is soundly based upon and warranted by existing 
law. Appellant has made good faith arguments regarding the interpretation and construction of 
U.C.A. 30-3-10.4, has raised in good faith a viable legal argument regarding the Fullmer case, has 
challenged the trial court's application of existing law to the facts of this case, and has argued that 
the trial court failed to make a finding of fact, regarding the cause of the joint custody relationship 
breakdown, in conformance with the evidence adduced at trial.. As the preceding arguments 
demonstrate, this appeal clearly has a strong factual and legal basis. Appellee's request for 
attorney fees is unwarranted and must be denied. 
Appellee also claims attorney's fees should be awarded based on appellee's financial need. 
"Attorney fees on appeal may be granted in the discretion of the court in conformance with 
statute or rule. Management Services Corp. v. Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 
1980). Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-3 (1984) provides that either party to a divorce action may be 
ordered to pay the adverse party to prosecute or defend the action. This includes attorney fees 
incurred on appeal." Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989). 
In the present case, both parties sought an award of attorney's fees at the trial court level. 
The trial court, however, ordered each party to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. Because 
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the trial court did not award attorney's fees to appellee, she is not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees on appeal. In Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 727 (Utah App. 1994), the court 
addressed a similar situation: 
"Generally, when a trial court awards fees in a divorce action to a party who then prevails 
on appeal, that party will also be entitled to fees on appeal. Crouse v. Grouse. 817 P.2d 
836, 840 (Utah App. 1991). However, in the present case, the trial court did not award 
attorney fees to either party in the action below. Therefore, regardless of which party 
prevails on appeal, and absent any showing that the parties' financial situation has changed 
subsequent to the time of the trial court's decision, both parties must bear their own fees 
on appeal. Cf. Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 470-71 (Utah App. 1989) (remanding to trial 
court for determination of whether financial circumstances of party who was denied 
attorney fees incurred at trial had changed such that an award of fees incurred on appeal 
was appropriate)." 
In the case at bar, appellee has not made any showing that the parties' financial situation 
has changed since the time of the trial court's decision. Accordingly, Larson dictates that appellee 
must bear her own attorney fees on appeal. 
In the alternative, this court may choose to remand the matter for a hearing to determine 
"the need of the claiming spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, the reasonableness of the 
fees and the amount, if any, to be paid." Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 
App. 1994). The Schaumberg court held that where new allegations of a change in financial 
condition are not a matter of record and have not been adjudicated by a finder of fact, the 
appellate court cannot evaluate that claim, and it may be remanded to the trial court for 
determination. Id at 604. However, a remand is not required, because the decision to award 
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attorney's fees lies within the sound discretion of the appellate court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee's contentions are devoid of legal merit. First, the rule requiring marshaling of 
the evidence has no application to this appeal, as appellant has not directly challenged the factual 
findings made by the trial court. Second, U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(2), reasonably and properly 
construed, is not applicable to the facts of this case. Third, contrary to appellee's contention, the 
trial court's findings regarding the best interests of the children are not dispositive of this appeal, 
because the trial court never should have reached that step in the analysis. 
The trial court erred by failing to recognize that the breakdown in the joint custodial 
relationship was a result of the custody litigation initiated by appellee. As a result, the trial court 
erred in its application of U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1) to the facts of this case, because the trial court 
should not have considered changes in circumstance unilaterally created by appellee in an attempt 
to reopen the custody issue. Lastly, it is clear that this appeal is not frivolous, and an award of 
attorney fees is not warranted. 
The trial court's decision should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2^* day of C^JJph^^ 1997. 
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